

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL HAMBURG

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMCONSUL STUTTGART

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 20396

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR, EE

SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S EE MONTH: A FURTHER GERMAN VIEW

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REF: BONN 19910

SUMMARY: FONOFF HAS CONFIRMED ITS EARLIER TENTATIVE CONCLUSION REPORTED REFTEL THAT MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE USSR'S "EE MONTH" IS TO TIGHTEN THINGS UP IN EASTERN EUROPE. FONOFF'S ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL MEETINGS AGREES WITH CONCLUSIONS OF U.S. REPORTING FROM EASTERN EUROPE. ONE ASPECT STRESSED IN FONOFF THINKING IS BELIEF THAT PRESENT ACTIVITY BY MOSCOW IS DESIGNED TO OFFSET OR EXPLOIT (AS THE CASE MAY BE) THE RESULTS OF THE ECPC IN BERLIN. END SUMMARY.

1. ACCORDING TO FONOFF SOURCES, THE FRG HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE PURPOSE OF MOSCOW'S "EE MONTH" IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS CONSOLIDATION WAS DESIRABLE FROM MOSCOW'S POINT OF VIEW IN ORDER TO OFFSET CONCESSIONS MADE IN THE BERLIN ECPC DOCUMENT TOWARD PARTY AUTONOMY. THE SOUGHT-AFTER CONSOLIDATION IS ALSO USEFUL IN OFFSETTING THE INFLUENCE OF WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ON EAST EUROPEAN PARTIES, AS EVIDENCED DURING THE ECPC AND SUBSEQUENTLY. MOSCOW ALSO USES CONCESSIONS IT GAINED AT BERLIN, ESPECIALLY ON FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, TO LINE UP EAST EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET POSITIONS.

2. IN SEEKING CONSOLIDATION, THE FONOFF EXPECTS THE USSR TO TRY TO EXPLOIT THE STRENGTH THAT PRICE INCREASES IN RAW MATERIALS HAVE GIVEN IT IN ORDER TO BETTER ITS POLITICAL SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE.

3. CONSOLIDATION IN EE MAY LEAD TO NEW INITIATIVES TOWARD THE WEST, BUT THE FONOFF HAS SEEN NO INDICATION SO FAR THAT SUCH MOVES ARE IN THE WORKS. IN THIS CONNECTION, FONOFF DISMISSES PROPOSALS IN THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NON-INCREASE IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERSHIP AS PROPAGANDA MOVES. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY IF CONSOLIDATION WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS OVERTURES TO THE WEST -- POSSIBLY DURING VISITS BY BREZHNEV TO MAJOR WESTERN CAPITALS -- BUT AT THIS STAGE FONOFF IS INCLINED TO THINK THE CONSOLIDATION IN EE IS AN END IN ITSELF.
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4. GIEREK: FONOFF VIEWS REMAIN AS REPORTED REFTEL. WE HAVE RECEIVED ADDED THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS RECOGNIZE THAT GIEREK CANNOT AT PRESENT DELIVER SOME FORMS OF CONSOLIDATION THAT USSR WOULD LIKE TO SEE (E.G., COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE). THEY, THEREFORE, DID NOT PRESS FOR THIS, BUT RATHER STRESSED RESTORATION OF DISCIPLINE. BASIC SOVIET POSITION REMAINS, IN FONOFF'S

OPINION, ONE OF SUPPORT FOR GIEREK.

5. TITO: FONOFF, AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF BELGRADE DOCUMENTS, HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE RESULT OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT WAS A DRAW, WITH PERHAPS A SLIGHT EDGE TO TITO. BREZHNEV UNDERTOOK THE VISIT TO CONSOLIDATE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES. FONOFF BELIEVES RUSSIANS ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE A REINTERPRETATION OF THE ECPC BERLIN DOCUMENT. IN DOING SO, THEY AROUSED YUGOSLAV DISTRUST. RESULT WAS A BAD ATMOSPHERE AND THE COMPROMISE REPORTED IN BELGRADE 7787, WHICH MOSCOW WILL NOW TRY TO USE AGAINST YUGOSLAV AND WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES. (COMMENT: OUR READING OF COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY REFERENCE TO "VOLUNTARY COOPERATION," ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT PARTIES "ACT IN DIFFERENT CONDITIONS," AND LACK OF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 20396

REFERENCE TO "UNITY" OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT -- SEE RL
481/76 -- DOES NOT SUPPORT FONOFF'S CONCLUSION THAT
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THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF
COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, WE AGREE THAT RUSSIANS
WILL TRY TO USE WHAT THEY HAVE FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSE,
AS PREDICTED IN MOSCOW'S 10532.)

6. FONOFF ALSO BELIEVES THAT RUSSIANS WILL CONTINUE TO
DEVELOP ALL LEVELS OF CONTACTS WITH YUGOSLAVS IN AN
ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE YUGOSLAVIA INTO COMMUNIST CAMP
TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD, THE
RUSSIANS WANT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY "UNDERSTAND"
YUGOSLAV SITUATION ("EMBRACE OF BEAR AS DANGEROUS
AS ITS BITE" -- BELGRADE 7787) THEREBY LEADING
YUGOSLAVS TO MAKE LESS TROUBLE IN SOCIALIST WORLD.
FONOFF CONCLUDED ITS ANALYSIS BY NOTING YUGOSLAV/SOVIET
"COMMON BUT LIMITED JOINT INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE
STATUS QUO."

7. CEAUSES: FONOFF ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT
TO BUCHAREST IS NOT AS DETAILED. MOTIVE ON PART OF
RUSSIANS WAS SIMPLY TO FULFILL OBLIGATION AND TO LINK
A BILATERAL SUMMIT WITH THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT. ON
PART OF ROMANIANS, FONOFF BELIEVES THAT ECONOMIC
DIFFICULTIES (AS WELL AS PARTY PRESSURES REPORTED
BONN 19075) ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR BUCHAREST'S
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOSCOW. IT SEES NOT BASIC CHANGE IN
ROMANIA'S POLICY TO BE "AS INDEPENDENT AS POSSIBLE,"
BUT BELIEVES ROMANIA MAY BE LESS ABLE TO BE AS
INDEPENDENT AS IN PAST. FONOFF SEES SOME HARD-FOUGHT
COMPROMISES IN COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE, BUT HERE IT HAS
NOT LOOKED AT THE DOCUMENTS IN THE DETAIL THAT IT HAS
LOOKED AT BELGRADE.

8. WARSAW PACT SUMMIT: AS REPORTED SEPTEL, FONOFF SEES THE DECLARATION LARGELY AS A PROPAGANDA DEVICE, RESTATING INTEREST IN DETENTE, BUT FROM EASTERN POSITIONS. IT ALSO SEES IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE BERLIN ECPC LANGUAGE MORE COMPATIBLE WITH ORTHODOX MOSCOW VIEWS. IT NOTES LACK OF REFERENCE TO CHINA AND WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE.

9. WHAT NEXT? THE FONOFF THINKS IT IS TOO EARLY TO
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SAY WHAT WILL FOLLOW ALL THIS ACTIVITY IN EASTERN EUROPE. IF ONE BELIEVES MOSCOW'S PURPOSE WAS TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITHIN THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND TO EXPLOIT THE STRENGTH THAT RAW MATERIAL PRICE INCREASES GIVES THE USSR, THEN IT FOLLOWS THAT PERHAPS THE DEED IS DONE AND ANOTHER ACT WILL NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW ON. WHILE THE BOOK IS STILL OPEN ON POSSIBLE NEW INITIATIVES TOWARD THE WEST, THE FONOFF CONCLUDES THAT THE RUSSIANS DID OBTAIN AGREED POSITIONS ON MAJOR PENDING MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS ALSO COMING TO THE BELIEF THAT MOSCOW WANTS TO GET RID OF THE BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE AT THE SMALLEST POSSIBLE EXPENSE.
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